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The Eucken Review

(Organ of the Eucken Society)

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

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THE EUCKEN REVIEW

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At the Turning Point.

By

Prof. Dr. ED. HEYCK

Ermatingen (Switzerland).

Certain as it is that thousands of years hence the nations will still be individuals and will represent different genera of mankind, it is equally obvious that the surface of their temporary being shows uniform aspects because it is influenced in a similar manner. In that stage which is called "culture" they may even be said to approximate to a kind of community, which, in a certain sense, was already the case in the Neolithic Age. It would be a futile endeavour to cure the morbid infections of that culture in one single nation. Even though this might seem feasible, it would not be possible to isolate permanently the sound members from the diseased ones. And yet the several national curative attempts are valuable, as, in spite of the differences in the individualities of the nations, they throw light upon the peculiar qualities of the infectious germs and upon the inherent dispositions for recovery.

Everybody is, by this time, convinced that the malignant infection which has been preying on the cultured nations of to-day is Materialism. Hitherto doctors have contented themselves with summarily applying political plasters and social salves to the inflamed skin and its opening wounds. It is, however, necessary that the whole force of nature should, in a more elementary manner, revolt against the evil which threatens it and eats into it. Nor must one treat only the classes of mankind, but, on the contrary, try to reach the individual person. As long as the latter is alive he owns moral forces which those petti-fogging doctors forgot to take into account or which their prejudices prevented them from discerning. Once already a gigantic mind has lifted his people and not only his own people, from decay, Martin Luther, who brushed aside all reforming Councils of the Church and of the Empire, political pamphleteers, revolutionary zealots, iconoclasts, mystic romanticists and apocalyptic prophets, and proved himself the superior man by appealing to the positive qualities of faith, love and fellow-feeling, and convinced every one personally that those were his capabilities and his need. About the year 1500 the question was not merely that of the Reformation of the Church. This was only the outer coat, as it were, and yet, at the same time, the inner core of the great transformation. The 15th century was as grossly materialistic as is our present time, as much cleft asunder by class-hatred, mutual caluminations and recriminations, and a most specialized gradation of extortion and usury, which centred in the patrician trusts. Estranged from all noble poetic sentiment and without any poetry, the century was deeply immoral and lascivious, sunk down to beating the record in Epicurism and licentiousness, faddism in dress, bragging und foolery, to the full extent of the means each social class was able to afford. Luther's work was not confined to theology. His view took in the whole range of interconnections. He flung himself into the thick of the conflicting interests. He intervened between the revolutionary lowest class, which were then the peasants, and the princes, and he brought them together again, by pointing out to the latter their proper calling, as educators of the people and their rightful mediators, and made the peasants the reliable foundation for the stability of the state and its well-being. He took part in the fight against usury and taught people how to distinguish it from honest trade. He grappled with the popular vices, such as luxury display and foolery of the richer classes; he renewed the family and home-life, restored to men and women respectability and self-esteem. He reunited the different classes by bringing them to better understand each other. All this he accomplished by directing man's attention to his personal soul rather than to "good works". What he called "the Freedom of a Christian" was his moral self-responsibility and his personal relation to the Highest, and this high appeal to the individual member of the community he popularized by linking it on to the best popular traditions, which had been abandoned and forgotten. For this purpose, since he appealed to everyone personally, he wrote in the German language, translated the Bible for the people, created the German literary

language, renewed the treasury of good German proverbs, gave a new start to German songs and singing. He restored the genuine Teutonic-German soul; but his influence had a transforming and morally rejuvenating effect even on the non-German countries and on that part of the world which did not follow his ecclesiastical reform. The present age is better prepared than the 15th century was for carrying out the idea of solidarity. Our task to-day is, however, more particularly to take our stand with regard to a number of sham-idealisms. It may cause surprise, if we place in the same category Socialism, Internationalism, Centralism, Unitarism, Parliamentarism. But we have only to glance at the movement in Italy, nay in France even, where those "isms" originated one and all. Even the typical Parliamentarism was shaped in France by the French Constituante of 1789—1791, and its immense success outside of France has, in the 19th century, influenced even the renovations and invisible transformations of the English Parliament.

Mussolini once characterized the Fascism as a living movement instead of a bundle of doctrines and "immortal ideas". The ideas of the French Revolution here alluded to stand out as a warning: they are immortal because they were never able of direct realization. The idealism of this Revolution, however worthy of respect, contains the same Gallo-French element that makes the books of Jules Verne amusing. It conceals the point where the imaginative Esprit, which, after all, remains only a word, frees itself from the force of gravitation, to which all earthly things are subject. The joyfulness of the Constituante, commingled with national and personal vanities in the manner of Lafayette's, was impatient of matter-of-fact objections and was delivered from them by Mirabeau's death. It considered itself capable to create something more perfect than the admired England possessed, something absolute, of universal application. It replaced natural and purposed growth by the means of revolutions; it did not concern itself with the conditions, experiences, qualities, education, differentiation of men and nations, with historically evolved facts; it fetched down from the ethereal canopy of ideals Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, without troubling itself with the preliminary conditions. As it is, systematization and rhetoric are naturally, more than historical feeling, akin to the French mind, endowed with the power of ready construction. Moreover, France, at that time, was under the influence of the antihistorical, mathematical and scientific Encyclopædists. With regard to the English Constitution, the French overlooked the fact that it had been historically developing by Acts, Statutes and Compromises as occasion arose, that it rested, so to speak, on a propædeutic Teutonic Selfgovernment, which selfgovernment had always been wanting in France, the latter, on the contrary, having been early subject to a royal centralization. The principal oversight, however, was that the English Parliament had sprung from a representation of established Estates. In short, the English Constitution was unconsciously conceived to be the work of an unknown liberal Solon, the defective consistency of which Constitution it was reserved for the Constituante to detect. In fact, the decrees of the Revolution only completed the levelling and equalizing action of royalty. One proclaimed a sovereign democracy, and succeeded in interesting in this kind of government nobody but the oratorical placehunters, because the purely arithmetical franchise-law took no notice of the concrete capabilities and living interests of the citizens, nay, rather disowned them.

The complete centralization into "France une et indivisible" negatived the growth of a distinctive culture in the Provinces. This unitarism, too, had its share in making the individuals of the nation idle spectators of an absolutism that carried on the business of governing in the capital. Only, that the Court with its ambitious office-seekers and place-hunters had been replaced by Parliamentarism with its organs and clienteles, a second bureaucracy of no less centralized a character. The new society that had sprung up from the Revolution considered itself no longer bound by the personal "Noblesse oblige" of the old aristocracy, and so there issued from the altruistic ideals, as a governing class, a self-seeking bourgeoisie, which even after the Napoleonic intermezzo speedily reassumed its old position. The disappointment caused thereby gave birth to the socialistic, communistic, Icarian theories, based on the same constructive optimism whose entrance into the history of the world had taken place in 1791. They were unwilling to be taught by experience and devoid of any true ethics, as is shown by R. Eucken in a study as original as unprejudiced (Reclam, Univ. Bibl. Nr. 6131, 6132). All these systems have, in their different varieties, the aim of extending to every body the advantages of the bourgeoisie, which they scornfully condemn. The community which they invent produces no better result than to deprive the individual of his best natural endowments, his higher aspirations, his reverence, his responsibility, his personal achievements, his struggling efforts, the joyful feeling of his power and his attainments.

The Revolution, which intended to give every body every right and demanded no worthiness for it, began

the great debasement and destruction of the quality of man, which has become the distinctive mark of the 19th century and its public culture. This debasement is associated with the closely related art of persuasion. This, more especially, has for its subsidiary aim to work upon the still remaining idealistic sentiments. By unscrupulous propagandism it has most successfully drilled the masses into willing instruments for the destruction of everything that offered resistance to the absolute rule of materialism, such as faith, reverence, historical feeling, morality, national sentiment, civic virtue. The most concrete realization of materialistic power, the cosmopolitic Plutocracy, became in the most important civilized countries the visible or concealed wirepuller of the international Socialism injustly called the Democracy, but also of a large part of the professedly national and conservative classes. Parliamentarism is powerless in the face of this anonymous minority rule. From a representation of the people it has become an instrument for reducing to silence the real community, as far as it is capable of thought and judgment. The most powerful part of the Press, which sides with the financial powers, as well as the apparently opposed part, which professes to be anticapitalistic, is bent upon the spiritual spoliation and moral degradation of mankind. We wish to emphasize again that in all the parties men of good and noble will are to be found. It is indeed the highest testimonial to the inherent goodness of human nature that it believes in a better state and strives for it, while it is being led astray be scheming agitators.

The 19th century, born by the French Revolution, was, as Amiel of Geneva expressed it two generations ago, bound to take the road "au triomphe de la lie (dregs) et de la platitude". In the mean time, Alexis de Tocqueville in France had already soon after the Revolution of July, laid bare the errors in what one there believed to be a Democracy. Democracy, in its true meaning, can only be obtained by a double Federalism, a social and a territorial one, by the federation of the classes and the territorial divisions. For the idea of democracy is ultimately based upon personality, its self-respect and its public spontaneity. Under military constitutions the value of the individual and its peculiarity is smothered. France, which at home said the most sarcastic bon mots about the principles of 1791, but publicly claimed the glory of being the mother country of Freedom, was warned by de Tocqueville that instead of the abortive French democracy the Anglo-Saxon democracy would be the victorious model, as being based on the feeling of liberty of the individuals and on their co-operation.

France itself is to-day revising the principles which have been glorified for more than a century, though more vociferously than sincerely. The "régionalisme" in modern France of to-day is destined to regenerate the historical and individual life of the territorial divisions. The highly remarkable movement of the "États-généraux" aims at a popular representation, which shall be composed of the delegates of the great corporations (churches and universities), of the intellectual and productive vocations and of regionalism. The provisional object of the États-généraux, as it is modestly as well as ironically set forth, is to bring the opinions and real wants of the nation to the knowledge of the Parliament of Deputies (which, as is well known, is, with a few execptions, composed of Parisian advocates).

Also the Italian Fascism regonizes the regional life as the true "concretezza" of the country and as "the inexhaustible source of a constantly fresh national power". In his inquiries into the causes of the decay of Italian and Continental Liberalism, Mussolini singled out two principal ones: its want of historical feeling (want of reverence for the great traditions and for the teachings of experience) and its open or indirect devotion to the internationally entwined Plutocracy.

The present times witness, in different countries, the remarkable spectacle of simultaneous attempts at curing the infection that was spreading and was treated by quacks in the 19th century. The movement is partly directed against Parliamentarism, partly it gives more directly the name of that oriental-international people which is the principal representative of Materialism as well as of the sham-idealistic movement, and which, at the same time, by means of the Press makes the opinion that one nation is to have of the other. Since the representatives of that oriental people, distinguished alike by assiduity and solidarity, are trying hard to preach Internationalism to the lower as well as to the intellectual classes, it is characteristic of the movement springing up against them, that it foreshadows the future to be realised in the shape of a strengthening of everything National, Regional, Individual. The catchword of the famous socialist Marx, whose family-name was Mordechai, "Proletarians of all countries unite" has at last met with its long overdue complement by the Patriots of all countries beginning to form a spiritual united front. Their struggle would, however, be an unworthy one if it were directed against that single race. For this would not, by any means, hit all the culprits and it would hit many innocent persons. It is a profoundly Christian notion, rather to suffer wrong than to do wrong. This wrong is avoided where the

offensive, instead of being directed against the representatives, is directed against the will itself. It is the secret of Mussolini's success and overwhelming authority that he kept the Fascio free from mean an low influences. He defined it as a revolt against Materialism in general. Instead of the lowlevel ideal of the "equal" citoyens he put forward the more genuine democratic postulate that every individual should strive to be a model citizen, and every Italian was to contribute his share to the universal advancement of mankind by being as excellent and honourable an Italian as possible.

We are in the initial stage of a movement that points upwards to raise mankind again from the "triomphe de la lie et de la platitude". This movement is sure to prove victorious. For man is endowed with a longing for whatever is good, which only needs to be rescued from misleading and lowering influences. It is the most palpable proof of the nobler sentiments of mankind that, in naively looking back on the past it always believes to see the good old times, and that it divides up the world's history after the names of its great and achieving men. In other words, human memory eliminates what is mean, ugly and contemptible. In its traditions it collects all that is vigorous, straight and creative, and just as Luther fastened his reforms on the half-buried German popular traditions, it is consistent that the present champions of a moral renascence should appeal to the long-tried honourable traditions in the nations and re-establish the historical continuity after the breakdown of the principles of the 19th century. It is not enough to expel the money-changers from the outer court of the temple. It is, above all, neccessary to restore in the interior of the plundered and much-disgraced temple the sanctifying and elevating feeling of reverence.

What a Non-Professional thinks about the Administration of Justice and Social Life.

By

RUDOLF EUCKEN.

1. Want of firm Principles.

Our public law, like other spheres of life suffers from the want of clear aims and firm principles rooted in life as a whole. We are to be compared to an architect who wishes to build a handsome house but has no clearly devised plan, and who, according to his changing opinions and moods, starts work sometimes from this sometimes from the opposite side. Can we be astonished that such a man fails in his work?

2. The Community and the Individuals.

Has law to acknowledge a community that is superior to individuals, that directs and controls individual life? or is it the individuals who form the community according to their own peculiarities and who direct all measures as their own interests require?

This controversy is that of the materialistic and organic theory of social order, both theories are important as to their consequences for practical life. The first theory, promising to deliver the individual from all obstacles, urges the individual to make the best out of its peculiar gifts; the result, however, is no community, but an incoherent multitude of coexisting individuals who have no unity and cannot give any impulses to promote the welfare of the community; but the organic community has a unity, it justifies charity and self-sacrifice, but it endangers the independence and originality of individual life. To account for the peculiarities of human society we therefore have to understand it as a community above the individuals as well as a reality in the soul of the individual; we may call it an autonomy or a microcosm; in any case the mechanical and organic theories, which are opposed to each other, do not comprise the whole problem.

Average Socialism offers a strange discrepancy with regard to this problem: it tries to establish a community above the individuals; but this community of Socialism, prejudiced in materialism, is a mere summing up of individuals whithout any organic unity. Socialism endeavours to establish a community but what it realises is only a society.

3. Objectivism and Subjectivism.

Is law with all its institutions creative or does it only help to satisfy human wants? These two opinions are continually opposed to each other throughout history. The former way of thinking has often been too harsh with the individual, our present time is liable to the opposite danger: to neglect the objective facts and to have too much confidence in the opinions and sentiments of men: To this is often connected a dangerous optimism which considers man as a noble and wise being, but which fails to see that those who strive after unlimited independence are very often ruled by vulgar instincts, the supposed freedom is transformed to moral enslavement. This we should consider

if we try to establish new matrimonial statutes. These are certainly very complicated, because they involve many contrary interests, which it is very troublesome to balance equally. But there should be no question whatever that matrimony is indispensable and of great moral importance. They are shallow thinkers who try to move this corner-stone of our morals and civilisation, and only a very blamable frivolity can disregard its responsibility.

4. Plain Principles or Detailed Prescriptions.

The experience of history proves that only plain and popular principles of law are effective on human souls. All the great world-religions have proclaimed their ethical demands in precise and short formulations, e. g. the Romans in their twelve tables. Only concise laws make a deep impression and inspire with awe. It is a great nuisance to force living reality into paragraphs mingling essential and non-essential things.

Already Plato said: If all was regulated by prescriptions, life, which is rather difficult enough, would be quite insupportable. We sincerely wish that a superior man of a wise and at the same time of a humane mind should succeed in extricating fundamental principles out of the chaos of prescriptions and to impress them upon the whole nation especially on young people while they are educated. With the help of such leading principles we may more easily find a way out of the embarassing multitude of laws and may even rely on our own judgement.

5. International or National Law.

It is true that all law is rooted in our spiritual nature, which is above national differences. This original unity is well compatible with a variety of forms; nations as well a individuals are not mere examples of the species 'man'; only individual achievements give life its full reality. Our present time is still under the influence of rationalism which overestimates the abstract intellect, whereas the mighty revolution and the impulse which German Humanism and historical thinking have given to mankind have altogether disappeared from the minds of many contemporaries who still live in the spiritual atmosphere of the 18th century. We hope that, with the coming reforms of law, not the Roman formal conception but the German conception of individuality and liberty will have the decisive influence.

6. Liberty and Equality.

Already with Greek philosophers the two ideas of liberty and equality were closely connected without having the acuteness of modern life. Liberty was reserved to citizens; it was the contrast to slavery that gave liberty its peculiar dignity and sanctiness. The first champion of equality of possessions was, according to Aristotle, Phaleas of Calcedon. — In modern times the combination of liberty and equality first appears in the society of Paris. (Montesquieu for instance says in his 'Lettres Persanes' 1721: In Paris there rule liberty and equality.) Rousseau has laid a special stress on that combination which became the chief party-cry of the French Revolution. It would lead us too far to go into further details, what we have to insist upon is: that liberty and equality have not the same meaning, that they easily turn out very different in meaning. Liberty wants space and independence to develop all faculties in a free competition and by a differentiation of individuals, whereas equality has a tendency to level all differences, oppressing all that is above the average; thus equality can be the deadly enemy of liberty as we often find it now-a-days. But there can be no doubt whatever of full equality before God, Reason, and Law. 'May we be unequal before the world, but before God we are all equal, children of Adam, creatures of God and one man is worth the other.' (Luther.)

7. Law and Morality.

Law overcomes the contrast of optimism and pessimism; a one-sided optimism does not need any help of law and a one-sided pessimism has no moral but only a mechanical effect, between these two there stands Law which is rather inclined to a moderate pessimism. The experience of jurists teaches us that men are good and righteous not from mere love of the good, but that they want a strong compulsion not to turn out criminals. But at the same time all human community is based on the conviction and the belief that men, in some degree at least, take part in the life of community, and that they are, under certain conditions, able to make sacrifices to it. But law generally cannot much rely on morality. The strongest impulses of human life are on one side a thirst for power and glory, on the other side a desire for pleasure and material wealth; only a small number, that will never be as numerous as to form a whole state, is above such average-men.

8. Constitution and our Time.

When Aristotle with his clear insight was dealing with various forms of constitutions, he put the question: which constitution is best fitted for all states; the same question is put to us: which constitution is best fitted to modern conditions.

The parliamentary democratic constitution is generally thought the paramount of political wisdom; we have not to decide if that is true; but it is certainly quite wrong to press one particular constitution as obligatory upon all nations in spite of their great differences in civilisation and thinking. What is a blessing to one people may be the ruin of another. Only the abstract way of rational thinking can try to force all the variety of living state organisms into one form according to fixed patterns.

9. Family and Women.

All social philosophers regard the home and the family as the primeval cell of common life, they all are of opinion that any damage to these can by no means be repaired. But recent development brings heavy dangers, especially those big tenement-houses and factories endanger the life and welfare of the family. But apart from this the position of women has become uncertain. In former times her chief duties were household duties, now many circumstances combine to take her away from and make her a stranger to her home. This is most strikingly demonstrated where women are occupied in factories; but there are many other instances that show a strong tendency to push women out of the house to make them take part in public affairs and take charge of public offices, to emancipate them. Householdwork is regarded as inferior work. It is true many reformers are at work against full emancipation of women, and nobody wishes to shorten the rights of women. But whatever we may think of the growing share of women in public affairs: public duties should not endanger the chief task of women which is endangered if household duties are pushed back.

Our present time offers new important duties to bring domestic life to its full development, duties which are intimately connected with our mental and spiritual life, with education, civilisation, art, and charity. There is much to do for women who may well get out of all narrow-mindedness and who have a will and opinion of their own, not in opposition but in harmony with their householdwork. Let us beware of undervaluing these every-day duties and of looking for splendour and honour in the outside world instead of looking for a calm and unchanged activity in the little world inside the house; for out of little things great things will arise.

10. Blessing and Curse of Work.

Nature has not implanted man with an instinct for work, it is want that forces him to work. But gradually work produces pleasure. Man begins to like work and to appreciate work in itself; it honours the German people to have given proof of such thinking and to have realised excellent achievements. But it was a fatal change when man, by mechanical work in factories, lost the personal touch with his work, which became a troublesome burden to him, which he should like to get rid of or at least to make as easy as possible. Now-a-days we suffer much from the ensuing consequences, and we know how difficult it is to overcome them. But we must not weaken our efforts and must also not exaggerate the difficulties. First let us remember that not all hard work is factory work, and that within a factory there are many differences in work; we must not generalise extreme conditions. But the important and urgent question remains: how far we may succeed in giving the worker more interest and pleasure in his work. Further on we ask for a full acknowledgement of the peculiarities of brain-work. It cannot be measured by time, it should penetrate and fill the whole life. How much preparation and devotion is required of a doctor, an engineer, a scientific teacher. Such work is no pleasure, it requires pains and self-sacrifice; there is no good work but requires some self-conquest. Only materialism thinks mental work to be of inferior value and tries to increase the work of middle-class workers, which damages the common life of all classes. After this lamentable misfortune has come over us, we all have to work more than in former times; but there must be an even adjustment of these burdens and it must not always, under all conditions, be considered a flagrant injustice to exceed the working day of eight hours. The welfare of the whole people and the state matters more than that of a single class; all justice is undermined if this is lost sight of. (Translated by R.)

The Ethics of Work.

By

Pfarrer Dr. OSTERTAG, München.

As a critic of civilisation, R. Eucken better than any of his contemporaries, recognized with accute penetration the fatal conception of work, now-a-days spread in large circles. This fatal conception is a striking feature in the wide-spread crisis of modern civilisation. In different passages of his works,

especially in "Zur Sammlung der Geister", our keen-sighted philosopher hits the right nail on the head. "On the one hand", he says, "the German has a strong inclination of domineering over the visible world. He wants to seize, to penetrate and to dominate it; on the other, he energetically strives after and courageously fights for an invisible transcendental world. According to the sight the critic has in view, the Germans passed either for a nation of excellent competitors, or for a people of pure spiritual culture". — "In work for work's sake," the German finds the zenith of life; here work attracts the soul and thus, from a simple means, becomes an independent object. Thus work is an ethical power, it brings about a moral strengthening of man, it delivers him from narrowing egoism, an expulsion of fluctuating arbitrary proceeding, a ready submission to the laws and demands of the cause, on the whole, a moral growth of man." (Zur Sammlung der Geister p. 29, 31/32.) Following Eucken's avowed wish to see his fundamental thoughts developed and diffused, we shall try to set forth a few ideas on the ethics of work indicating as an essential point that work should not only be considered as a merchandise, but also as a duty and therefore workers must not only consider the prize but also the value, duty and value however are not material things.

1. Materialism considers work only as a merchandise. Marx, the still highly appreciated theorist of socialism, says in his book "Labour and Capital": "Labour is a merchandise, no more and no less than sugar. The former is measured by the clock, the latter by scales." "Labour is a merchandise which its proprietor, the hired labourer, sells to the capital." If labour however is a merchandise, it follows that every proprietor of that merchandise makes an effort to sell it for the highest possible price, moreover, he can keep it back and thus has a right to strike, and finally it rests with him to sell the merchandise or not, that is to say, to be willing to work or not. For this fundamental point of view, let us first elucidate a confusion of ideas which has been noticed even by socialists. It is wrong not to define the term of work.

At least three different ideas namely ability, execution and produce are to bee taken into consideration. Moreover, not only abstract notions, but also moral conceptions have to be rectified. Work, as we know, is not only a merchandise, but also a duty. Merchandise in itself does not include moral obligation for sale, whereas work in itself comprises a moral obligation. There may be a great deal of truth in the assertion that work is a merchandise, this assertion however becomes wrong as soon as it means that work is nothing but merchandise. It is altogether the mistake of materialism to take the lowest degree of reality for reality on the whole. The mistake of materialism perhaps does not lie in the purport of its assertions, but in the acceptance of these assertions. There is not only nature and mechanism, but also spirit und metaphysics. There is not only pleasure and enjoyment, but also conscience and conscientiousness, not only instincts and impulses but also duty and obligations. Duties, it is true, express certain fundamental orders of human life, which have always been acknowledged. To them belongs the obligation to work. Thou shalt work!

It does not alter matters that the practical life of certain primitive peoples is the contrary of diligence and industry and that physical labour among civilized nations may be considered as the work of slaves. Besides this, we may agree with Marx's doctrine in so much as we are without doubt morally authorised to demand an adequate payment for our work. Perhaps even strikes are morally justified, if, like war, they are looked upon, as the very last resort. But all such questions as payment and strike are second rate questions. On the other hand, it is and remains a first rate question if work depends on our fancy and free will, if we devote ourselves to work or to idleness. The answer can only be that work is not at all left to our free will. We must work for conscience's sake. In the Christian religion work is a divine law. There is no doubting the fact that in the Bible work is looked upon as a religious duty, as it has been proved in a very meritorious book "Gospel and Work" by Simon Weber, a Catholic priest. It is sufficiently known that to Luther work was in a high degree service and obedience to God and with regard to Calvinism much ernergetic and practical work was brought forth.

2. We go back to Marx. If work is nothing but merchandise, naturalism is right in concluding that work can only be a matter of price. Whatever materialism says of the value of work does not refer to work in a philosophical or ethical sense, but to its remuneration in money. Therefore Marxism generally provokes the fiercest fights for pay. In connection with this equalisation of work and price, the socialistic dogmatists form all kinds of theories of more and more increasing value, of real and of saleable price. Thus arises the appreciation of work as being nothing but a quantity, just as money is and the differentiation and appreciation of work as a quality disappears. Henceforth it is of no importance if the work is a master's or an apprentice's, a daylabourer's or a specialist's, a scholar's

or a manuel labourer's. This conclusion ultimately shows us that work as well as money is only a means of life and not life itself. Marx himself says in a very conclusive way: "Life begins where work ceases." This kind of work the labourer "sells to a third person in order to assure the daily bread for himself. His life's work therefore is for him nothing but a means to the end, his existence. He works to live, but his work is not a part of his life, on the contrary, it is a sacrifice taken from his life." These statements evidently contain also several errors. It is incorrect to consider work as a simple quantity, as it has been shown with ingenious sarcasm by Paul Ernst in his book: "The Collapse of Marxism." Revolution is the result of the theories of practical and saleable work as it is distinctly explained in Cathrein's work "Socialism" and in other pamphlets. What we earnestly have to combat and to keep under control is the opinion that life only begins where work ceases. This combat, it is true, is only possible if we side with moral and ideal views and see a value in work. In fact in many kinds of work there is hardly any idealistic worth, so much the more it must be sought therein and work must be transformed into worth. Where is there any worth in the monotonous work in a factory? Nevertheless all the difficulties to find out its value is no counter-evidence, on the contrary a reinforced impulse, for the sense of work lies in its moral and ideal value, as it may be noticed in many a symptom. As in the simplest and most unpretending things, God has included a secret blessing, so He did in work. Work is the source of many virtues and many joys. Work brings a sense into the world in general and into our lives in particular. He who works stands in the currents of events, he continues the past, stamps the present and believes in the future because he brings it about. Whilst idleness gives birth to and is the fostering-soil of vice, the individual and the community regain their health through work. Work gives tenor to life, work is the way to spirit, work demands spirit, work promotes spirit. The unyielding stuff is mastered only by the hand of him who has mastered it before in his mind. Work is the way to form character und personality. Work is man's best educator; it occupies hands and hearts and brings the salt of will into our life. It teaches love and patience, fidelity and thankfulness, selfcontroll and order, carefulness and devotion, objectiveness and sobriety, veneration for reality and responsability to man. Work is a successful killer of microbes, work leads us to selfcommand and self-knowledge; it shows us the limits of our abilities and faculties, it gives us honour before others and enables us to estimate others. He who works gets an incomparable und irretrievable feeling of satisfaction. Work gives steadiness and harmony to life. Work is the art of true conduct in life. Prattlers and simpletons fail in life, but he who faithfully, fulfills his duty remains in blessed contact with the soil out of which originates everything blissful to us, and a luminous cloud bowers down over his head. Persevering work gives style to our life and erects a building not imposing by a brilliant front-side, but by characteristic lines of solid and sound beauty. Just as every man finally bears the stamp of his professional work, so does the worker in general of the work of the day.

Now, if after this symptomatic consideration of work, we try to examine the principles that may guide the worker, we shall be obliged to say, work in its moral signification has a personal and a social value. To the materialist the individual is an atom, he knows no other aim, no end but utility. On this way, nobody has ever become a personality, by work however taken from an ideal stand-point everybody can become a personality. In spite of all their theories of association Marxism and socialism have never found the way to real community. Community of interest is no genuine community, it falls to pieces as quickly as it has arisen. On the contrary, work taken in its moral and idealistic sense, favours real community and brings forth moral forces, and moral forces always and everywhere promote and support community. If these are the chances and results of an idealistic conception of work, let us sincerely cherish the desire, that it may become the objective spirit of a new generation and age.

(Translated by Dr. Elise Lohmann.)

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